The V.I. Supreme Court has dismissed another appeal in the long-running commercial lease dispute between FirstBank Puerto Rico and Harthman Leasing III, LLLP, ruling that a separate case between the same parties has already conclusively determined who is entitled to possession of three disputed Estate Smith Bay parcels on St. Thomas.
In an opinion filed Tuesday, September 29, the Supreme Court declined to decide the merits of FirstBank's challenge to a 2016 forcible-entry-and-detainer judgment granting Harthman restitution of Parcels 17B, 17C and 17D. The justices concluded that subsequent proceedings in a separate civil lawsuit had already finally established Harthman's right to possess those same parcels, leaving the court unable to provide FirstBank any meaningful relief in the present appeal.
The ruling was authored by Associate Justice Harold W.L. Willocks and joined by Chief Justice Rhys S. Hodge and Associate Justice Denise M. Francois. The case was argued July 14 and decided September 29.
At its core is a commercial leasing dispute that has generated parallel litigation for more than a decade.
Harthman owns Parcels 17B, 17C, 17D and 17E in Estate Smith Bay. In 2003, Harthman leased Parcel 17B to East End Plaza, LLC, with a subsequent agreement adding Parcels 17C and 17D. East End Plaza later entered into a construction loan with FirstBank secured by its leasehold interest.
East End Plaza defaulted on both its lease obligations to Harthman and its loan agreement with FirstBank in 2011. Rather than foreclose on the leasehold, FirstBank accepted an assignment of East End Plaza's rights under the lease in March 2012 and became its successor with respect to the lease's rights and obligations.
A central dispute quickly emerged over Parcel 17E. FirstBank maintained that the parcel had never been included in the lease and argued that rent and arrearages should therefore be recalculated. When FirstBank and Harthman could not resolve the issue, Harthman terminated the lease in May 2012, and FirstBank responded by filing a civil action seeking a declaration that Parcel 17E was not part of the leased premises.
That lawsuit expanded to include breach-of-contract and other claims, while Harthman counterclaimed for, among other things, possession of the property. FirstBank continued paying rent for Parcels 17B, 17C and 17D through August 2014 but began depositing the money into an attorney escrow account the following month rather than paying Harthman directly.
While that broader lawsuit remained pending, Harthman launched a separate forcible entry and detainer, or FED, action in 2015, seeking possession of Parcels 17B, 17C and 17D on the basis that FirstBank had failed to pay rent due under the lease.
FirstBank argued that the FED action should be dismissed because the earlier civil lawsuit already involved the same underlying dispute. The Magistrate Division rejected that position and, following a January 2016 hearing, entered judgment on March 9, 2016 granting Harthman restitution of all three parcels. The magistrate concluded that FirstBank had no legitimate basis to withhold rent and place the money in escrow.
FirstBank appealed that ruling to the Superior Court, raising several issues, including whether it had been entitled to withhold rent, whether the Magistrate Division exceeded its authority in interpreting the lease, and whether Harthman's earlier civil action should have prevented the later FED case from proceeding.
That intermediate appeal remained unresolved for years. On March 12, 2024, the Superior Court eventually affirmed the Magistrate Division's judgment “in all respects” and dismissed FirstBank's appeal with prejudice.
A procedural issue then developed over whether FirstBank had received proper notice of that 2024 ruling. In October 2025 — more than a year after the order — FirstBank asked the Superior Court to formally re-enter it or otherwise reopen the appeal period. The Superior Court granted relief and gave FirstBank 30 days to appeal. Harthman did not oppose those requests at the time.
Before the Supreme Court, Harthman later argued that FirstBank's appeal was nevertheless untimely. The justices rejected that challenge, finding that the deadlines contained in the Virgin Islands appellate rules are claims-processing rules rather than limits on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. More importantly, the court found Harthman had failed to preserve its specific arguments because it did not raise them when FirstBank sought additional time before the Superior Court.
But clearing that procedural hurdle did not get FirstBank to a ruling on the substance of its appeal.
While the 2015 FED case was working its way through the courts, the original 2012 civil lawsuit had continued independently. In June 2021, the Superior Court concluded in that case that Parcel 17E had never become part of the lease but nevertheless awarded Harthman possession of Parcels 17B, 17C and 17D. It later revised the legal reasoning for that result, concluding that FirstBank's failure to cure East End Plaza's default entitled Harthman to possession.
FirstBank appealed that judgment as well.
In August 2025, the V.I. Supreme Court issued a separate opinion in that case. The court determined that Parcel 17E had indeed never been added to the lease and ordered the damages judgment recalculated to exclude an erroneous award associated with that parcel. But the court left undisturbed the ruling granting Harthman possession of Parcels 17B, 17C and 17D.
FirstBank subsequently sought rehearing concerning the possession issues. The Supreme Court denied that request on July 2, 2026, making the possession determination final for purposes relevant to the new appeal.
That development ultimately determined Tuesday's case.
The Supreme Court explained that an FED proceeding is designed as a streamlined process for determining the immediate right to possession of property. The only practical issue remaining in FirstBank's latest appeal was therefore whether Harthman was entitled to restitution of Parcels 17B, 17C and 17D under the 2015 FED judgment.
But another final judgment had already established Harthman's right to possess exactly those parcels.
Any decision now affirming or reversing the earlier FED judgment would consequently have “no practical effect on the parties' possessory rights,” the court concluded. Because the separate civil case had conclusively determined possession, the justices said they could no longer grant FirstBank effective relief on that question.
The court raised the mootness question on its own, even though neither FirstBank nor Harthman had asked it to dismiss the case on that basis. The justices said deciding an already-resolved possession controversy could waste judicial resources, risk inconsistent rulings and undermine the finality of the judgment entered in the separate civil case.
Under the specific circumstances of this case, the court held that mootness operated as a mandatory, nonwaivable claims-processing rule. With no applicable exception, the court dismissed FirstBank's appeal without reaching its substantive challenges to the 2016 FED judgment.
“Based on the foregoing, this Court must invoke the mootness doctrine and will not review this case on its merits,” the opinion concludes. The appeal from the Superior Court's 2024 affirmance of Harthman's restitution judgment was therefore dismissed as moot.
